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Abstract—We consider heterogeneous networks with multiple
femtocells and macrocells. Femto-base stations (femto-BS) are
constrained to allocate transmitting powers such that the total
interference at each macro-user terminal (macro-UT) is below a
given threshold. We formulate a power allocation problem as a
concave game with femto-BSs as players and multiple macro-UTs
enforcing coupled constraints. Equilibrium selection is based on
the concept of normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) . When the
interference at a femto-user terminal (femto-UT) from adjacent
femto-BSs is negligible, for any strictly concave nondecreasing
utility the NNE is unique and the NNE is the solution of a
concave potential game. We also propose a distributed algorithm
which converges to the unique NNE. When the interference is
not negligible, an NNE may not be unique and the computation
of NNE has exponential complexity . We introduce the concept
of weakly normalized Nash equilibrium (WNNE) which keeps the
most of NNEs’ interesting properties but, in contrast to the latter,
the WNNE can be determined with low complexity. We show the
usefulness of the WNNE concept for the relevant case of Shannon
capacity as femto-BS’s utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intercell interference coordination (ICIC) in heterogeneous
networks was already recognized as a crucial issue in 4G wire-
less network standardization (LTE-Advanced) and significant
standardization efforts were devoted towards devising proto-
cols to support ICIC schemes. Nowadays, network heterogene-
ity is recognized as a driving feature in the conception of
5G wireless networks and it will be an intrinsic characteristic
of future generation networks. Therefore, efficient, scalable,
and low complexity interference coordination techniques are
needed to improve the existing LTE-Advanced systems and
to inspire protocol definition for 5G networks. In [1], a study
by Zhao et al. identified the interference caused by femto-
cell communications to downlink communications in macro-
cells as the most detrimental kind of interference in standard
heterogeneous networks, i.e. networks consisting of coexisting
femto-cells and macro-cells. For an overview of interference
management techniques for femto-cells the interested reader
can refer to [2]. Power allocation is an effective ICIC ap-
proach that allows universal frequency reuse with the well-
known benefits in terms of system spectral efficiency. It can
be performed in a centralized or distributed way. In this
paper, we focused on distributed techniques based on non-
cooperative games. Various kinds of non-cooperative games
have been proposed to address the power allocation problem
in this heterogeneous network setting. In [4], [13], [14],
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the power allocation problem is formulated as a Stackelberg
game with macro-UTs as leaders and femto-BSs as followers.
The Stalckelberg game framework combined with stochastic
learning methods is adopted in [5]. Due to space limitation,
an exhaustive overview of the game theoretical approaches to
power allocation in heterogeneous networks exceeds the scope
of this work and the interested reader can refer to [4].
In this paper, we formulate the power allocation problem
among femto-BSs as a coupled constrained concave game [7]
with femto-BSs as players. Thus, in contrast to Stackelberg
games considered in above literature, macro-UTs do not need
to know the utility functions of femto-BSs. As a result, our
model is readily scalable and implementable. In order to
design distributed algorithms converging to a well defined
and unique NE, as in [3], we resort to the concept of NNE
introduced by Rosen in [7]. In contrast to [3], we relax the
restrictive assumptions of a single macro-UT and interference-
free femto cells and we address the general problem with M
macro-UTs and presence of co-channel interference among
femto-cells. We contribute in this space. The presence of
multiple macro-cells in the system raises a problem of com-
putational complexity in determining the unique NNE: the
NNE computation does not boil down to an ordinary water-
filling problem as in [3], by applying standard techniques it
turns out that the problem has exponential complexity in the
number of macro-UTs and femto-BSs and we are not aware of
the techniques that solve it with low complexity. Along with
increasing complexity, co-channel interference among femto-
cells has the effect of destroying the property of uniqueness
of NNE always satisfied in the setting considered in [3].
To address the latter issue, we identify a class of utility
functions which admits a unique NNE also in presence of co-
channel interference among femto-cells. Then, we introduce
the concept of WNNE in Section V which enables us to extend
the scope of NNE for a specific utility set to any other set of
strictly increasing utility functions.
Low complexity methods to determine an NNE or WNNE
in presence of multiple constraints and co-channel interference
are presented in Section VI by leveraging on the properties of
constrained concave potential games [6]. We show that, when
the NNE is unique, solving a potential game is equivalent to
determining the NNE. Additionally, we introduce a distributed
algorithm converging to the NNE when the game is strictly
concave potential. In the distributed algorithm macro-UTs only
need to track the total interference from all femto-BSs and
femto-BSs only need to know their own channel parameters.
Fig. 1. Macro-BS, macro-UTs, femto-BSs and femto-UTs in a region. Circles
represent the range of base stations. Macro-BS has higher coverage compared
to femto-BS. Femto-UTs are placed close to the femto-UT. Femto-BSs can
cause interference at a macro-UT if it is in the range of femto-BS.
We show that the NNE can be implemented in a distributed
manner for a large class of utility functions even in presence
of co-channel interference among femto cells.
In Section VI-D the significance of WNNE is illustrated by
the analysis of a specific game with the maximum achievable
rate as utility function for each femto-UTs in presence of
co-channel interference among femto-cells. In general, this
game does not admit a unique NNE or a potential function.
Standard techniques to compute a NNE have exponential
complexity. We leverage on the WNNE, which can be obtained
using the strictly concave constrained potential game, in order
to implement an NE in a distributed fashion which retains
desirable properties of NNE. Finally we numerically evaluate
various properties of NNE solution for some well known utility
functions in Section VII.
Notation. Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower
case and bold capital letters, respectively; ·T denotes the trans-
pose operator; the notation x  0 stays for componentwise
inequality; 1M is the M -dimensional column vectors of ones.
The vector v−i is obtained from vector v by suppressing the
ith component. The matrix operator  denotes the Hadamard
or component wise product; D = diag(v) maps vector v onto
a diagonal matrix with diagonal component d`,` = v`. The set
of nonnegative real numbers in denoted by R+.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a heterogeneous network consisting of F
femto-BSs equipped with single antenna and serving a single
femto-UT per channel use and M macro-UTs (Fig. 1). The
macro-UTs can be served by a single macro-BS or differ-
ent macro-BSs. We do not make any assumptions regard-
ing the distribution of femto-BSs, femto-UTs and macro-
UTs except the fact that femto-UTs are located close to
the femto-BSs. Let hf be the channel gain between femto-
BS f and femto-UT f and ĥfm the channel gain between
femto-BS f and macro-UT m. Finally, h̃fk is the channel
gain between femto-BS k and femto-UT f. The femto-BS f
transmits with power pf ≥ 0. For future use, it is conve-
nient to define the following vectors p = (p1, p2, . . . , pF )T ,
h = (h1, h2, . . . , hF )








m = 1, . . . ,M, ĥf = (ĥf1 , ĥ
f
2 , . . . , ĥ
f
M )
T , and h̃f =
(h̃f1 , h̃
f




f+1, . . . h̃
f
F )
T , with f = 1, . . . , F.
The interference from femto-BSs at macro-UT m is given
by
Im = p
T ĥm m = 1, . . . ,M. (1)
Note that in this setting we are interested only in keeping the
interference caused by femto-base stations to macro-UT below
a certain acceptable limit. In fact, in practice, the interference
from macro-BSs to macro-UTs is efficiently controlled by
proper beamforming design and coordinated beamforming.
The signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) at femto-
UT f is given by
γf =
pfhf
σ2 + pT−f h̃
f
(2)
where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise
that accounts also for interference from macro-BSs. In general
γf is a function of the power vector p. When it is convenient,
we explicitly point out this dependence by writing γf (p),
otherwise we omit it and use the short notation γf . When
the interference from adjacent femto-BSs is negligible, i.e.





In the following, we assume that each femto-BS has com-
plete knowledge of the channel, i.e. it knows h, ĥm, for
m = 1, . . . ,M and h̃f , for f = 1, . . . , F. It is worth noticing
that the acquisition of these pieces of information is costly
in terms of both bandwidth and signal processing efforts.
Then, it is convenient to reduce the necessary information,
for example by approximating pT−f h̃
f with a constant value
and modeling it as white noise. In this case, the SINR reduces
to the expression of the SNR with an increased variance for
the Gaussian noise. Alternatively, we introduce distributed
algorithms based on local information in Section VI.
In order to keep the quality of the downlink communications
in each macro-UT acceptable, total interference from all the
femto-BSs must be below the following acceptable limit
pT ĥm ≤ IT m = 1, . . . ,M. (3)
We consider identical threshold at different macro-UTs in
order to keep notations simple. The extension to the general
case with different thresholds is straightforward.
Additionally, the transmit powers are constrained to a max-
imum value PMAX such that
p  PMAX1F . (4)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLUTION CONCEPT
A. Problem Formulation
Each femto-BS performs a power control with the objective
of maximizing the quality of its communication in downlink.
Its communication quality is characterized by a function
Uf (γf ), where Uf (·) is a concave nondecreasing function.
We formulate the power allocation at femto-BSs as a non-
cooperative game where each femto-BS aims to maximize its
utility Uf (γf ) under constraints1(3).
1Throughout the rest of this paper, to keep notation and equations compact,
we do not consider constraints (4). They are orthogonal and can be immedi-
ately embedded in the proposed game theoretical framework. The extension of
all the results presented here to the case including these additional constraints
is straightforward.
More specifically, we define this non-cooperative game in
a strategic form as
G = {F ,P, {uf (p)}f∈F} (5)
where the elements of the game are
• Player set: Set of the femto-BSs F = {1, ..., F};
• Strategy set: P = {p|p ∈ RF+ and pT ĥm ≤ IT , m =
1, . . .M}, where RF+ is the product space of F nonneg-
ative real spaces R+.
• Utility set: the functions uf (p) are defined as uf (p) ≡






, being Uf (·) : R+ → R+
a concave nondecreasing function in R+.
We adopt a NE of the non-cooperative game G as a power
allocation policy for the femto-BSs of the heterogeneous
network. More specifically, the power allocation vector p∗ is














for all pf such that (p∗1, . . . p
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RF+ and concave for pf ∈ R+ and the set P is convex and
closed, we conclude that G falls in the class of concave games
with coupled constraints studied in [7] and a NE exists [7].
B. Normalized Nash Equilibrium
The strategy set P is convex and bounded Boundedness is
immediately verified when we assume that each femto-BS’s
transmitted signal impinges on at least one of the receiving
macro-BSs, i.e. there exists no femto-BS f such that ĥfm = 0
for all m = 1, . . . ,M .Thus, sufficient conditions for strong
duality, the so-called constraint qualifications, are satisfied (see
e.g. [8], [9]).
Under the further assumption that the functions Uf , for all
f = F , possess continuous first derivatives, we can use the
necessary and sufficient KKT conditions for constrained max-
ima (see e.g. [8]) to obtain conditions satisfied by a NE p∗. If
p∗ is a NE, then, there exist F vectors λf = (λf1 , λ
f
2 . . . , λ
f
M )
with λf ≥ 0 such that p∗ ∈ P satisfies the following system
of equations
λfm(p
T ĥm − IT ) = 0 m = 1, . . .M









(pT ĥm − IT ) = 0 f = 1, . . . F
(8)






− λf T ĥf = 0, f = 1, . . . F (9)
p∗ is a normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) if KKT conditions
in (7)-(9) are satisfied with λf = λ for all f ∈ F i.e.
the Lagrangians are identical for each player. It has several
advantages: First, the Lagrangian multiplier λfm can be viewed
as the price per unit of interference caused by player f at
macro-UT m. In the case of NNE, all the femto-BSs pay the
same price for the interference caused to a certain macro-UT.
Thus, a macro-UT does not have to select different prices for
different players. Additionally, it will be clear from the de-
centralized implementation proposed in Section VI, the above
property considerably reduces the cost and the complexity
of the signaling among macro-UTs and femto-BSs. Second,
In the distributed algorithm thanks to the properties of the
Lagrangian multipliers for a NNE, each Macro-UT only needs
to track the sum of the interference in order to calculate the
price and doe not need to track interference from each player
which is not feasible in practice.
Since KKT conditions are necessary, thus, once the λ is
specified each player’s decision is also specified by the KKT
conditions. Thus, if the optimal λ is found, each player can
individually obtain its own NNE strategy using that λ.
Since NNE has favorable properties to be implemented in
a decentralized fashion, we henceforth examine the NNE.
IV. ON THE UNIQUENESS OF A NNE
The uniqueness of a NNE for concave games with coupled
constrained has been studied in [7]. We shortly summarize the
results obtained in [7] in the following





























If the symmetric matrix G(p)+GT (p) is negative definite for
all p ∈ P, then there exists a unique vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λM )
such that a unique NE p∗ satisfies all the KKT conditions in
(7)-(9) with λfm = λm for all f ∈ F and m = 1, . . . ,M , i.e.
NNE is unique 2.
In order to study the uniqueness of an NNE, throughout this
section, we assume that the utility functions Uf (·) are twice
differentiable and strictly concave and we analyze under which
conditions the game G defined for the heterogeneous network
with femto-BSs as players admits a unique NNE.
First, we focus on the case when the interference from
adjacent femto-BSs is negligible at all the femto-UT, i.e.
uf (p) = Uf (γ
′

































2The condition is sufficient, but not necessary. In [7] a weaker condition is
provided for the uniqueness of NNE. We do not consider that property since
it is very difficult to verify that condition in practice.
Thanks to the assumption of strict concavity of Uf (·), for
f ∈ F , for every p ∈ P , all the diagonal elements of the
matrix G(p) are strictly negative and according to Proposition
1, NNE is unique.
Now, consider the case where the interference from adjacent



















(σ2 + pT−f h̃
f )2
. Then, the general expression of
matrix G(p) is presented in (14) at the bottom of next page
and the properties of the matrix G(p) strictly depend on the
selected functions Uf (·), f ∈ F , on the realizations of the
channels h and h̃f , f ∈ F . In general, it is not clear that the
matrix G(p) + GT (p) is negative definite for every p ∈ P
and thus, the uniqueness of the normalized Nash equilibrium
is not guaranteed. Even for given functions Uf (·), f ∈ F , and
channel h and h̃f , it might be impossible to show that the
condition of Proposition 1 is satisfied.
V. WEAKLY NORMALIZED NE
In order to have an equilibrium selection criterion yielding
a unique NE, whose uniqueness can be simply verified, we
introduce the concept of weakly normalized Nash equilibrium
with respect to a set of functions {Vf (·)|Vf : R+ → R+} by
leveraging on the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let G ≡ {F ,P, {Uf (γf )}f∈F} and G′ ≡
{F ,P, {Vf (γf )}f∈F} be two games of the kind defined in
(5) with identical player and strategy sets and different utility
sets. Let the functions Vf and Uf , f ∈ F , be strictly increasing
functions. Then, if p∗ is a NE of game G′, then it is also a
NE for game G.
Proof: Assume that p∗ is a NE for G′ but not for G. Then,
there exists a pf such that (pf ,p∗−f ) ∈ P and
Uf (γf (pf ,p
∗
−f )) > Uf (γf (p
∗)).
Since Uf is increasing then γf (pf ,p∗−f ) > γf (p
∗). But also
Vf is an increasing function in γf and
Vf (γf (pf ,p
∗
−f )) > Vf (γf (p
∗)).
This contradicts the assumption that p∗ is a NE for G′. Thus,
p∗ is a NE for both G and G′. 
Now, we formally define the weakly normalized NE
(WNNE) using the above proposition:
Definition 1. Let game G′ with utility set V ≡ {Vf (γf )|f ∈
F} and strictly increasing Vf (·) have a NNE p. Then p is
also a NE of the game G with utility set U ≡ {Uf (γf )|f ∈ F}
and strictly increasing Uf (·). This NE p will be denoted as
the Weakly Normalized Nash equilibrium (WNNE) of G with
respect to the utility set V .
Note that WNNE depends on the set of utility functions
V . If the game G′ with the specified set of utility function V
admits a unique NNE, then there is a unique WNNE of the
game G with respect to the utility set V .
For some game G the NNE may not be unique and the
computation of an NNE can be highly costly in terms of
the computational complexity, e.g. exponential complexity in
the number of femto-BSs and macro-UTs, while it can be
possible to identify a WNNE with respect to a different set
of utility functions with lower complexity, e.g. polynomial
complexity in the number of femto-BSs and macro-UTs. Also
WNNE retains some favorable properties of NNE as it caters
to distributed setting discussed in Section III-B. Section VI-D
will enlighten the benefit of the WNNE concept related to the
computational complexity in determining an NNE.
In our setting, the concept of WNNE can be illustrated by




vf (p) = log(γ) = log
(
pfhf




Note that it is worthwhile to consider such a utility function
thanks to the following features:
•
∑
f∈F log(γf ) is the utility function underlying a pro-
portionally fair SINR allocation.
• When SINR  1, then the maximum achievable rate
of each femto-UT, shortly referred as Shannon capacity,
log(1 + SINR) can be approximated by log(SINR), i.e.
log(1 + SINR) ≈ log(SINR).
• For certain applications (e.g. voice transmission) the










the matrix G(p) in (14) reduces to a diagonal matrix with
strictly negative diagonal elements for every p ∈ P with utility
functions V . Thus, by Proposition 1 the NNE p is unique for
the above game. We can adopt p as a unique WNNE induced
by the set V to any game G of the kind defined in (5) with
strictly increasing utility functions Uf (·), f ∈ F .
VI. COMPUTING A NORMALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
irst, we discuss coupled constrained potential games. Subse-
quently, we show that finding NNE is equivalent to solving the
concave potential game. We propose a distributed algorithm
for strictly concave potential game. Subsequently, we identify
a class of utility functions which admit strictly concave poten-
tial functions. Finally, we discuss the significance of obtaining
an NNE in such a game as it induces a WNNE in a broad class
of games, as shown in the previous section.
A. Constrained Concave Potential Games
We first point out the novel contributions of our work on
constrained concave potential games compared to the works
[12] and [6] on the topic of constrained potential games: To
the best of our knowledge our work is the first to provide
a relationship between potential games and with NNE in a
heterogeneous network with multiple femto-BSs, femto-UTs
and macro-UTs. In fact [6] and [12] considered a multiple
access channel (MAC) channel. In contrast, the channel model
we consider here is an interference channel which presents
much higher complexity than a MAC. For example, utility
functions like the Shannon capacity that in a MAC setting
admits potential functions, but does not admit a potential
function in presence of inter-femto cells interference for an
interference channel. Additionally, we provide a broad class
of utility functions which admit concave potential games.
Finally, we propose a distributed algorithm by leveraging on
the concave potential game. This distributed algorithm enables
us to implement NNE or WNNE in a distributed fashion in
interference channel which was not considered in [6] and [12].
Let us first introduce the following definitions used throughout.
Definition 2. [12] A non-cooperative game G with utility set
{uf (p)|f ∈ F} is a potential game if there exists a function
Φ(p) such that for all f ∈ F and (pf ,p−f ), (p′f ,p−f ) ∈ P:
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f ,p−f ) = uf (pf ,p−f )− uf (p′f ,p−f ).
Definition 3. [12] A potential game is called a concave
potential game if the potential function Φ(p) is concave in
p ∈ P . If Φ(p) is strictly concave, it is called as strictly
concave game.
Remark 1. For a differentiable utility function uf (·), Φ(·) is






∀f ∈ F . (16)
The utility of introducing the concave potential game is
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a potential function Φ(p)
of the game G defined in (5) as G = {F ,P, {uf (p)|f ∈ F}}.
The solution of the following optimization problem referred to
as CCPG is an NNE.
CCPG maximizep Φ(p)
subject to p ∈ P
Proof. Let p∗ be an optimal solution to CCPG. First, note that
p∗ is an NE. If it was not, then there would exist a p′f such










Since Φ(·) is a potential function, (17) implies that
Φ(p∗f ,p
∗




−f ). This contradicts the fact that p
∗
is an optimal solution.
Since p∗ is an optimal solution, thus, according to the KKT
conditions there exists a ν = (ν1, . . . , νM )T  0M such that
∂Φ
∂pf
− νĥf = 0 ∀f ∈ F (18)
at p = p∗, with
νm(p
T ĥm − IT ) = 0 ∀m. (19)
Identifying λ in (7)–(9) with ν we can easily discern that p∗
is indeed an NNE. Hence, the result follows.
Remark 2. Note that if an NNE is unique then the solution of
CCPG is the unique NNE. If a coupled constraint concave
game G admits a potential function, in general, not every
NNE can be expressed as a solution of CCPG. However, if the
potential function is concave, then,each NNE is a solution of
CCPG since KKT conditions are also sufficient and necessary
for optimality in the concave potential games.
B. A Distributed Algorithm to Determine an NNE
In Section VI-A we showed that when a coupled constrained
concave game G has a unique NNE and admits a potential
function, we can solve the potential game in order to achieve




only depends on pf ,∀f ∈ F , then there
exists a distributed algorithm which converges to the unique
optimal solution p∗ and the dual optimal solution λ∗. The
distributed algorithm is the following:
Algorithm DIST
Initially macro-UT m selects λ0 ∈ RM+ \ {0} randomly3
At iteration k + 1 = 1, 2, . . . , the following tasks are
performed:
1) Each femto-BS f sets
pk+1f = argmax
pf≥0
Φ(pf )− pfλk,ĥf (20)
Then, all the femto-BSs transmit with updated power
level pk+1 = (pk+11 , p
k+1
2 , . . . p
k+1
F ).







f − IT ))
+ (21)
where δ > 0 is a sufficiently small constant4. Macro-UT
m reports the updated cost λk+1m to all the femto-BSs.
Since solution of CCPG is a NNE and Φ(·) is strictly concave,
thus, the convergence of Algorithm DIST follows immediately
from known results in [11] and it is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. Algorithm DIST converges to the unique op-
timal primal solution p∗ and dual solution λ∗ when Φ(·) is
strictly concave in p.
3λ0 is initialized arbitrarily.
4If there is no communication is possible between macro-UT and femto-BS,
then instead of macro-UT, macro-BS can compute the price for its macro-UT
and sends it to femto-BS.
G(p) =

κ1h1 −κ1h̃12 . . . −κ1h̃1F
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on p−f ∀f ∈ F , then a femto-BS can solve the optimization
problem using local parameters measurable at the femto-
BS without need for costly feedback exchanges. Thus, even
though the solution of potential game CCPG requires to know
other femto-BSs information, NNE can be implemented in a
distributed manner where each femto-BS only needs to know
its own transmission parameter. Also note that each macro-UT
only needs to know the total interference it is experiencing
which is readily available5. It is practically infeasible to track
interference from each femto-BS to a macro-UT. Thus, the
distributed algorithm that we have provided is readily scalable
and implementable without the need of a central controller.
In the following Section VI-C and VI-D we will introduce




on p−f ,∀f ∈ F . Thus, the import of the results is that we
can implement a distributed algorithm which converges to a
unique NNE for a large class of utility functions.
C. Negligible Inter-Femtocell Interference
In this section, we show that when the inter femto-cell
interference is negligible, then the game is a strictly concave
potential game. We have already shown in Section IV that
the NNE is unique in this setting. Thus, from Proposition 3,
we can obtain the unique NNE by solving the potential game
CCPG.
In this setting, SINR reduces to the SNR γ′f (p) =
pfhf
σ2
,∀f ∈ F . Thus, femto-BS f ’s utility Uf (γf ) = Uf (γ′f )
is only a function of pf in this scenario. Next lemma shows
that in this scenario every game G defined in (5) is a potential
game and if Uf (·) is strictly concave, then the potential game
is also strictly concave.




f (p)). Then, Φ(p) is a
potential function for game G defined in (5) with utility set
{Uf (γ′f )|f ∈ F}. Moreover, if Uf (·) is strictly concave, then
so Φ(·) is.
Proof. Since Uf (γ′f ) does not depend on p−f , for any f ∈ F
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f ,p−f ) =
Uf (γ
′
f (pf ,p−f ))− Uf (γ′f (p′f ,p−f ))
for any (pf ,p−f ), (p′f ,p−f ) ∈ P. This proves that Φ(·) is a
potential function.
By the definition of Φ(·) and γ′f , it is clear that if Uf (·) is




does not depend on p−f in this setting, thus we
can apply Algorithm DIST, which will converge to optimal p∗
and dual variable λ∗.
5Note that the femto-BSs which are situated at a far-off location from
a macro-UT, we may assume that the interference from that femto-BS is
negligible in order to avoid communication overhead
D. Presence of Inter-Femtocell Interference
When the interference from adjacent femto-BSs is not
negligible at all the femto-UTs, then we have already seen
that an NNE may be not unique. However, in Section IV we
have identified a utility set V defining a game G, whose NNE
is unique and can be used to define unique WNNE for games
with different utility sets. In this section, we show that game
with utility set V admits a potential function.
Let us consider again the utility set V defined in (15). The
following lemma shows that the game G with the utility set V
defined in (15) is a potential game.
Lemma 2. Let Φ(p) =
∑
f log(pf ). Φ(p) is a potential
function for the game G defined in (5) and the utility set (15).
Moreover, the potential game is strictly concave.
Proof. Note that
Φ(pf ,p−f )− Φ(p′f , p−f ) = log(pf )− log(p′f ). (22)
But,














log(pf )− log(p′f ). (23)
Thus, comparing (22) and (23) we conclude that Φ(p) is a
potential function. It is easy to verify that Φ(p) is a strictly
concave function in p.
Hence, the solution of CCPG will provide the unique NNE
to game G defined in (5) with the utility set (15). We can
use Algorithm DIST described in Section VI-B to obtain the
unique NNE for a game G with utility set (15) since ∂Φ
∂pf
does
not depend on p−f for all f . Since Φ(p) is different from∑F
f=1 Vf (p), thus, NNE may not be an optimal solution of
the optimization problem where the objective is to maximize
the sum of the players’ utilities.
Now, we show that, in general, a potential game does not
exist in this setting by using the following result
Proposition 5. [10] For a twice continuously differentiable







(p), ∀p ∈ P.
It is easy to verify from (13) that in general the utilities
Uf (γf ) do not satisfy the conditions stated in Proposition 5.
There exist large classes of function Uf (γf (p)) which are
strictly concave functions of pf but still they do not admit a
potential function. One such examples is Uf (γf ) = log(1 +
γf ).
For all these cases when the functions Uf (·) are strictly
increasing, it is convenient to appeal to Proposition 2 and
resort to the concept of WNNE with respect to the utility set
V in (15). We have already shown in Lemma 2 that the game
G with utility set V in (15) is a strictly concave potential
game and thus, we can implement the distributed algorithm
proposed in Section VI-B to compute the unique NNE with
low complexity. Hence, we can easily obtain the WNNE for
the game G with Uf (γf ) = log(1+γf ) even though this latter
game is not a potential game.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically evaluate the characteristics of an NNE
strategy profile for several utilities. We consider two scenarios:
i) Interference at each femto-UT from adjacent femto-BSs
is negligible (γi ≈ SNRi), ii) Interference is not negligible
(γi = SINRi). To generate ĥim, h̃
i
f , we first randomly place
femto-BSs and macro-UTs in a disc of radius r1. Then, we
randomly place a femto-UT in a disc of radius r2 around each
femto-BS (Fig. 1). We take r1 > r2 because in practice, a
femto-UT is in a close vicinity of its femto-BS compared
to the size of a macro-cell. We compute the channel gain
between two nodes according to the formula: d−β where d is
the distance between two entities and β is a positive constant
with β = 2. For all simulations we take r1 = 20, r2 = 2, and
σ2 = 1. Throughout this section, we use the optimal value of




Uf (γf )∀p ∈ P (24)
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We consider the following utility functions
1) Shannon Capacity: Here Uf (γ′f ) = B log(1 + γ
′
f ).
2) Bit Error Rate: From [3] we can approximate bit error
rate (BER) for K-QAM modulation at femto-BS f as
follows:






Since each femto-BS wants to minimize the BER, we
define the utility function as
Uf (γ
′













, α 6= 1 (25)
Remark 3. It is easy to verify that the above functions are
strictly concave in γ′f . Thus, from Section VI we know that an
NNE is the optimal solution of CCPG with potential function∑
i Ui(·). Thus, UOPT is attained at the NNE strategy profile.
We set IT = 5dB and B = 1MHz and assume a 4-QAM
modulation for all the simulations in this subsection. First, we
study the variation of UOPT with the number of macro-UTs
for the Shannon capacity. Fig. 2 shows that, as the number
of macro-UTs increases, UOPT and the individual utilities
decrease. Intuitively, this happens because when the number
of macro-UTs increases the strategy set P can only reduce.
The decrement of UOPT becomes small as the number of
macro-UTs increases, thus an increase in the number of macro-
UTs does not affect the individual utility significantly above
a certain number of macro-UTs.
Fig. 3 reveals that the mean BER and each femto-BS’s BER
increase as the number of macro-UTs increases since each
femto-BS transmits lower power as the number of macro-UTs
increases. But the rate of increment slows down as the number
of macro-UTs increases. Intuitively, as the number of macro-
UTs increases the strategy set P remains almost identical.
Thus, the optimal power remains almost the same even when
the number of macro-UTs increases.
Fig. 4 reveals that as the number of macro-UTs increases
UOPT decreases when Uf (·) is according to equation (25).
This is because the strategy space P decreases as the number
of macro-UTs increases. Fig. 4 also reveals that only one
femto-BS’s payoff is significantly positive for a given number
of macro-UT, other players’ utilities are very low. Intuitively,
when α is very small, the utility Uf behaves like linear
function of γ′f . Thus, only the player which has high channel
gain and does not interfere significantly with a macro-UT gets
high utility, the other players’ select very low power, thus their
utilities are close to 0.
Fig.5 shows the convergence of Algorithm DIST for systems
with different number of femto-BSs, F = 3, 5, and 8.
Numerical computation reveals that the convergence rate is
higher for smaller number of femto-BSs.
B. Inter-Femtocell Interference Not Negligible
Here, γi is equal to SINRi. When we adopt the following
utility Uf (γf ) = log(γf ), f ∈ F , the game is a strictly con-
cave potential game, as shown in Section VI-D, with potential
function
∑
i log(pi). It is easy to verify that the maximization
of
∑
i Ui(γi) for p ∈ P is a geometric programming [15].
Hence, we can employ standard tools to compute UOPT. We
use the following notation: UNNE be the sum of utilities at the
NNE strategy profile pNNE.
Fig.6 reveals that as the number of femto-BSs increases
the difference between UOPT and UNNE increases. Intuitively,
when the number of femto-BSs is small, then the interference
at a femto-BS is not significant, thus UNNE closely matches
UOPT. But as the number of femto-BSs increases, UNNE
decreases at a faster rate and the difference between UNNE
and UOPT increases. Note that UOPT also decreases with the
number of femto-BSs. Intuitively, as Uf (γf ) = log(γf ), thus,
pf > 0 for any f ∈ F 6. Thus as the number of femto-
BSs increase the co-tier interference becomes significant as
each additional femto-BS will transmit a significant amount
of positive amount of power. Thus, UOPT decreases with the
the number of femto-BSs as the interference from other femto-
BSs become significant.
Shannon capacity: We consider utility functions, Uf (γf ) =
log(1 + γf ).
We numerically study the characteristics of the WNNE
solutions. Let UWNNE denote the total utility at a WNNE
pWNNE i.e. pWNNE is the solution of CCPG with Φ(p) =∑
f log(γf ) and UWNNE =
∑F
f=1 log(1 + γf (pWNNE)).
Fig. 7 reveals that initially UWNNE increases as the number of
femto-BSs increases. Intuitively, when the number of femto-
BSs is small, the co-tier interference is small and thus, total
utility UWNNE is high. But when the number of femto-BSs
becomes large the co-tier interference becomes significant,
6Otherwise, UOPT would be negative infinity.
Fig. 2. UOPT and Uf , f = 1, 2, 3 versus number
of macro-UTs for Shannon capacity and F = 3.
Fig. 3. log(BER) versus number of macro-UTs
for F = 3.
Fig. 4. UOPT and Uf , f = 1, . . . , 3 versus the
number of macro-UTs for functions in (25) (α =
0.1).
Fig. 5. Convergence analysis of Algorithm DIST
for F = 3, 5 and 8 femto-BSs.
Fig. 6. UOPT and UNNE versus number of
femto-BSs with M = 5.
Fig. 7. UWNNE and individual utilities versus
the number of femto-BSs for IT = 10.
thus, the individual utilities decrease significantly and thus,
the UWNNE also decreases. Fig.7 also shows that the fluc-
tuation of utilities across players are very limited for power
allocations based on the WNNE. Intuitively,
∑
i log(γi) is a
utility function underlying a proportional fair SINR allocation,
thus the players’ utilities vary on a relatively smaller range for
a power allocation based on an WNNE.
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